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I. INTRODUCTION 
Howell Township is a prototype of the quiet and prosperous New 
Jersey suburbs.  The town of 51,000 boasts a median household income 
of over $96,000, far exceeding the $53,657 national and $72,062 state 
medians.1  Its children attend one of three regional public high schools, 
all of which have been ranked in the state’s top third (with two in the top 
twenty percent).2  It hosts more than a dozen public parks, including the 
1,200-acre Manasquan Reservoir, where visitors can fish, boat, ride 
horses, and observe wildlife.3  Eighty-eight percent of Howell’s residents 
are white.4 
In 2015, Howell announced a plan to rezone twenty-seven wooded 
acres to permit construction of seventy-two affordable housing units.5  
The public response was immediate and severe.  Residents posted dozens 
of comments to Howell Happenings NJ, a Facebook community page 
administered by private residents of the township, ranging from the 
frantic (“Time to sell and get the heck out of here!”) to the ugly (“I moved 
to Howell 15 years ago to get away from garbage.  Now the garbage is 
getting dumped on top of me.”).6  The response by many residents at a 
 
 1  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Am. FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/cf/1.0 
/en/place/Howell township, Monmouth County, New Jersey/POPULATION/ 
DECENNIAL_CNT (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Am. FactFinder, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/cf/1.0/en/place/Howelltownship,MonmouthCounty, New 
Jersey/INCOME/MEDIAN_HH_INCOME (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016); Carmen DeNavas-
Walt & Bernadette D. Proctor, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2014 at 5, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2015), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/
Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-252.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Am. FactFinder, 
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/cf/1.0/en/state/NewJersey/INCOME/ 
MEDIAN_HH_INCOME (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016). 
 2  FREEHOLD REG’L HIGH SCH. DIST., Which High School will my Child Attend?, 
http://www.frhsd.com/cms/lib8/NJ01912687/Centricity/Domain/4/Attendance%20 
Boundaries.pdf (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016); N.J. MONTHLY, Top School Alphabetical List 
2014 (Sept. 2, 2014), http://njmonthly.com/articles/towns-schools/top-schools-alphabetical-
list/ (listing Freehold Township High School as 66th, Colts Neck High School as 68th, and 
Howell High School as 107th out of 339 schools in the list of 2014 top high schools). 
 3  HOWELL TWP., http://www.twp.howell.nj.us/Facilities (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016); 
MANASQUAN RESERVOIR CNTY. PARK, http://www.nynjtc.org/park/manasquan-reservoir (last 
accessed Oct. 30, 2016). 
 4  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Am. FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table 
/1.0/en/DEC/10_SF1/QTP3/0600000US3402533300 (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016). 
 5  Kala Kachmar, Taxes, Religion at Core of Howell Apartment Controversy, ASBURY 
PARK PRESS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/western-monmouth-
county/howell/2015/10/20/howell-affordable-housing-hearing/742440 
48/. 
 6  HOWELL HAPPENINGS NJ, https://www.facebook.com/Howell-Happenings-NJ-
157703170966044/ (last accessed Jan. 25, 2016); Alana Semuels, The Pervasive Fear of 
Affordable Housing in New Jersey, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/business/archive/2015/12/the-pervasive-fear-of-affordable-housing-in-new-
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township council meeting was decidedly more measured but no less 
critical, foreboding the usual suburban fears of higher taxes, busier 
traffic, and more crowded schools.7 
Some speakers at the meeting, unshielded by the relative anonymity 
of a Facebook page, cautioned against Howell becoming “Lakewood 
North”—referencing the neighboring town with a large Hasidic Jewish 
population.8  A woman urged, “We just want a fair chance to find out 
who would be moving in.”9  Many were concerned about the religious 
affiliation of the landowner, Rabbi Israel Meyer Hacohen, who was 
associated with the Rabbinical Seminary of America.10  A user on Howell 
Happenings NJ did not mince words: “This means we are going to have 
more Jewish families milking the system.”11 
When affluent white communities like Howell oppose affordable-
housing plans, their resistance often stems from “fear [of] the changes 
that they believe an influx of black, Latino, or lower-income white 
residents would bring.”12  The fear that affordable housing will attract an 
influx of Jewish residents is far less common but nonetheless springs 
from the same place: many residents “want[] their town to stay just as it 
[is],” and admitting a minority group would threaten that.13  There is also 
an argument of fairness: a resident might have spent decades saving to 
afford the price tag and property taxes on a house in an upscale suburb, 
and he feels cheated when “poor people just get to move there on the 
cheap.”14  Howell officials faced a difficult dilemma—”listen to [their] 
constituents and try to block the housing, or listen to the law.”15 
“The law” in this case referred to a March 2015 ruling by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey (“SCNJ”).16  Months before Howell 
released the controversial plan, the SCNJ decided that the state judiciary 
would resume enforcing an affordable-housing doctrine that was first 
 
jersey/421581/. 
 7  Kala Kachmar, Taxes, Religion at Core of Howell Apartment Controversy, ASBURY 
PARK PRESS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.app.com/story/news/local/western-monmouth-
county/howell/2015/10/20/howell-affordable-housing-hearing/742440 
48/. 
 8  Id. 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Alana Semuels, The Pervasive Fear of Affordable Housing in New Jersey, THE 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/the-
pervasive-fear-of-affordable-housing-in-new-jersey/421581/. 
 12  Id. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
 15  Id. 
 16  In re N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 (“Mount Laurel IV”), 110 A.3d 31 (N.J. 2015). 
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articulated in the 1970s but had since lapsed.17  In 1975, the SCNJ decided 
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.18  The 
landmark decision—commonly known as “Mount Laurel I”—interpreted 
the state constitution to require that municipalities use their zoning 
powers to provide low and moderate-income housing options.19  Thus 
arose the influential Mount Laurel doctrine, today a staple of property 
law casebooks.20  The Fair Share Housing Center (“FSHC”), a non-profit 
organization founded to enforce the doctrine on behalf of aggrieved 
parties, calls Mount Laurel I “one of the most significant civil rights cases 
in the United States since Brown v. Board of Education.”21 
At first, many local governments resisted Mount Laurel I.22  
Moreover, courts struggled to find the proper way to apply the doctrine, 
with “deficiencies . . . rang[ing] from uncertainty and inconsistency at the 
trial level to inflexible review criteria at the appellate level.”23  In 1983, 
the SCNJ reaffirmed that “[t]he doctrine is right” but admitted “its 
administration has been ineffective.”24  It decided the second Southern 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel case25 (“Mount 
Laurel II”) implementing several procedures that would “put some steel 
into th[e] doctrine.”26 
The New Jersey Legislature finally intervened in 1985 with the Fair 
Housing Act (“FHA”).27  One function of the FHA was to create the 
 
 17  Id. 
 18  S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (“Mount Laurel I”), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 
1975). 
 19  Id. 
 20  See, e.g., STEVEN SEMERARO, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY LAW IN THE U.S. 336 
(ver. 1.1 2014).  Less than a decade after Mount Laurel I, the Court itself observed that “[t]he 
doctrine has become famous.”  S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel (“Mount Laurel 
II”), 456 A.2d 390, 410 (N.J. 1983).  See also Alan Mallach, The Betrayal of Mount Laurel: 
Will New Jersey get away with Gutting its Landmark Fair Housing Legislation?, NAT’L HOUS. 
INST. (Mar./Apr. 2004), http://www.shelterforce.com/online/issues/134/ 
mtlaurel.html (“Ever since the [S]upreme Court’s pioneering Mount Laurel decisions in 1975 
and 1983, New Jersey has been seen as a leader across the nation for its efforts to create 
suburban affordable housing opportunities.”). 
 21  FAIR SHARE HOUS. CTR., What is the Mount Laurel Doctrine?, http://fairsharehousing.
org/mount-laurel-doctrine/ (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016). 
 22  Eight years after Mount Laurel I, the Court “believe[d] that there is widespread non-
compliance with the constitutional mandate of [its] original opinion.”  Mount Laurel II, 456 
A.2d at 410.  Even Mount Laurel Township itself had refused to comply with its namesake 
doctrine: “[T]en years after the trial court’s initial order invalidating its zoning ordinance, 
Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance.”  Id. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. at 411. 
 25  Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390. 
 26  Id. at 390, 410. 
 27  Fair Hous. Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2015). 
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Council on Affordable Housing (“COAH”), an administrative agency 
that would draft regulations to assign each municipality a share of the 
burden.28  But the statute hardly solved the problem, and the Mount 
Laurel cases were only the first skirmishes in a dispute that continues 
today.  In March 2015, citing the COAH’s failure to satisfy its 
constitutional burden, the SCNJ resumed its role as forum of first resort 
to evaluate whether a defendant municipality is complying with its Mount 
Laurel obligations—perhaps “the most significant action in the last 30 
years of the . . . doctrine.”29 
This note will argue that the SCNJ has been too tentative in 
managing the Mount Laurel problem.  The events of the last forty years 
demonstrate that the legislature and the executive—political branches 
subject to popular whim—cannot muster the will to commit to an 
affordable-housing solution compliant with their constitutional 
obligation.  Since the Mount Laurel I decision in 1975, the judiciary has 
demanded action that its collateral branches have failed to produce. 
Where the executive and legislature refuse to comply with the 
supreme law of the state, the SCNJ must take command: the SCNJ, 
pursuant to its duty to uphold the New Jersey Constitution, should 
eliminate any remedy that does not flow through the judicial branch.30  
The judiciary has demonstrated time and again that it takes seriously its 
Mount Laurel mandate, while the other branches have demonstrated only 
that they will put partisan political considerations before their state 
constitution. 
Still, this issue, like most issues with deep political implications, is 
solved most palatably by elected officials rather than by appointed 
judges.  It also raises thorny balance-of-powers problems.  Therefore, the 
judicial action proposed in this note should not be understood to foreclose 
the other branches from designing an effective legislative or 
administrative solution.  But even then, the SCNJ should evaluate such a 
solution skeptically, and the judicial branch should permanently remain 
a forum of first resort for Mount Laurel relief. 
Part II of this note will discuss relevant background details to 
support the subsequent analysis.  Part III will specify the particular sort 
of action the SCNJ should take and will argue why it is necessary.  Part 
IV will briefly conclude and will propose additional lines of inquiry. 
 
 28  Id. § 52:27D-305. 
 29  Gary Forshner, Affordable Housing: The Next Generation, N.J. L.J. (June 23, 2015); 
see also Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 35. 
 30  See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. VII, § I, ¶ 1 (“Every State officer . . . shall take and subscribe 
an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of this State.”); Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 
at 417 (“We may not build houses, but we do enforce the Constitution.”). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Three major background topics inform the later analysis.  First, it is 
crucial to understand how and why the Mount Laurel doctrine is a 
constitutional doctrine.  This note examines Mount Laurel I and the 
SCNJ’s reasoning therein.31  Second, to support the ultimate argument 
that the SCNJ should modify its enforcement of the doctrine, this note 
tracks Mount Laurel enforcement over the past forty years—a narrative 
that on its face exposes how legislative and executive approaches have 
been inadequate.32  Third, this note addresses the SCNJ’s latest 
pronouncements on the issue in its March 2015 decision.33 
A. Mount Laurel I and its Constitutional Implications 
By 1975, the states’ power to design and enforce zoning ordinances 
was long-settled law.  Euclid v. Ambler, the seminal United States zoning 
case, was decided nearly fifty years earlier.34  Nectow v. Cambridge 
followed shortly after and affirmed the practice of zoning in general 
(though it struck down the particular ordinance at issue).35  New Jersey, 
in a 1927 amendment to its constitution, proclaimed plainly that 
the Legislature may enact general laws under which 
municipalities . . . may adopt zoning ordinances limiting and 
restricting to specified districts and regulating therein, 
buildings and structures, according to their construction, and 
the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent 
of the uses of land, and the exercise of such authority shall be 
deemed to be within the police power of the State.36 
Zoning ordinances in the township of Mount Laurel permitted multi-
family dwellings for only farmers and their families and then only if they 
were set at least 200 feet from the property line.37  Attached townhouses, 
apartments, and mobile homes were outright prohibited.38  The realistic 
outcome of these rules, even if not their purpose, was permitting housing 
 
 31  See infra Part II.A. 
 32  See infra Part II.B. 
 33  See infra Part II.C. 
 34  Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 35  Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (confirming that “[t]he [zoning] ordinance 
is an elaborate one” but “[i]n its general scope it is conceded to be constitutional within [the 
Euclid precedent]”). 
 36  This language was incorporated into New Jersey’s 1947 constitution.  N.J. CONST. art. 
IV, § VI, ¶ 2. 
 37  S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d 465, 468 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1972) (“In defendant township multi-family dwellings are only permitted on a farm for 
a farmer, a member of the farmer’s family, or persons employed by the farmer, provided the 
multiple-family dwelling is not closer than 200 feet from the property boundary line.”). 
 38  Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 719. 
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that only middle or high-income residents could afford.39  For at least 
some of the township’s legislators, the unabashed goal was to “clear out 
substandard housing in the area and thereby get better citizens.”40  The 
township meant to “provide direct and substantial benefits to [its] 
taxpayers” by permitting new development for only higher-income 
residents.41 
i. Procedure and Issue 
It was against this backdrop that a group of plaintiffs sued Mount 
Laurel to challenge its zoning scheme.42  Though only “the minority 
group poor (black and Hispanic)” were directly represented in the suit, 
their essential complaint addressed a challenge faced also by “young and 
elderly couples, single persons and large, growing families not in the 
poverty class, but who still cannot afford the only kinds of housing 
realistically permitted in most places.”43 
The trial court acknowledged the breadth of the problem and 
lamented that “[t]he judiciary cannot be expected to alleviate a condition 
that definitely calls for legislative action from either the national or state 
governments.”44  The best the courts could do was to “meet each specific 
situation as it is presented.”45  The court recited recent examples of zoning 
laws that might have an effect similar to that of Mount Laurel’s, one 
tending to exclude lower-income residents: “ordinances which require 
minimum interior floor space; which limit lot sizes for a single-family 
unit to five acres; which absolutely prohibit the construction of any 
additional multi-family units; which prohibit the use of mobile homes on 
an individual lot, and which absolutely prohibit all mobile-home parks 
from a township.”46  Each of these was upheld, generating a record of 
“clearly enumerate[d] judicial standards” the courts could apply to future 
zoning schemes.47 
But Mount Laurel’s scheme overstepped even these standards.  The 
“patterns and practice” of the scheme indicated that Mount Laurel “ha[d] 
exhibited economic discrimination” with concern “solely for the 
betterment of middle and upper-income persons.”48  While a government 
 
 39  Id. 
 40  S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d at 468 (emphasis added). 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. at 465. 
 43  Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 717. 
 44  S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d at 472. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 467–68 (citations omitted). 
 47  Id. at 468. 
 48  Id. at 473. 
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may use its police power to legislate for the “general welfare” of its 
people, that phrase should not be construed to protect only “private 
welfare.”49  The Mount Laurel zoning ordinance was invalid.50 
An inevitable appeal followed, but the SCNJ recognized that “the 
implications of the issue presented are . . . broad and far-reaching” and it 
certified the parties’ appeals before the Appellate Division could hear 
arguments.51  The issue was not limited to only the poor African-
American and Hispanic plaintiffs and it was not limited to only Mount 
Laurel Township—the housing situation was no less than a statewide 
“crisis.”52  The SCNJ embraced the trial court’s reasoning and 
conclusion.  Mount Laurel was developing a variety of housing projects 
for segments of its population that would provide a more favorable tax 
base, yet “[a]ll this affirmative action . . . is in sharp contrast to the lack 
of action, and indeed hostility, with respect to affording any opportunity 
for decent housing for the township’s own poor living in substandard 
accommodations.”53  Proposals for less affluent housing were met with 
“fear . . . that such housing would attract low income families from 
outside the township.”54 
ii. Constitutional Principles 
Most land use regulations involve only practical, even mundane, 
questions of local planning and policy.  A municipal decision to limit lot 
sizes or to segregate industrial parks away from pastoral suburbia does 
not normally invoke the fundamental rights and privileges enshrined in 
the Constitution.55  But the SCNJ recognized that Mount Laurel I was not 
just an unglamorous case about local land use policy, rather it 
contemplated “the basic importance of housing and local regulations 
restricting its availability to substantial segments of the population.”56  
The case implicated “fundamental principles” of state law.57 
Surely, a state’s police power encompasses and permits land use 
regulation.58  If that principle was not clear enough after Euclid and its 
 
 49  Id. 
 50  Id. 
 51  Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 716. 
 52  Id. at 716–17. 
 53  Id. at 722. 
 54  Id. 
 55  See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 725 (“[A]s a matter of policy, we do not treat the 
validity of most land use ordinance provisions as involving matters of constitutional 
dimension; that classification is confined to major questions of fundamental import.”). 
 56  Id. at 725. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
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aftermath, it was confirmed by express language in the state 
constitution.59  A municipality might believe genuinely—and even 
correctly—that its exclusionary policies do serve the “general welfare,” 
especially if the inquiry is confined to only the municipality’s existing 
residents.  After all, Mount Laurel’s residents were surely better off 
(economically, at least) when their town contained fewer families with 
fewer school-age children.  Under New Jersey’s tax structure, “the fewer 
the school children, the lower the tax rate.”60  That this policy happened 
to exclude certain residents was, arguably, a result not of race or class-
based animus but of a cold fiscal calculation.61 
But town borders are often illusory, mere historical artifacts of local 
geography, commerce, or politics, and they do not yield vacuum-tight 
compartments where the policies and practices of one town cannot affect 
its neighbors.62  When the ordinances in one town inevitably ripple 
outward to touch others, “the welfare of the state’s citizens beyond the 
borders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be 
recognized and served.”63  It is “fundamental . . . that the zoning power is 
a police power of the state and [that] the local authority is acting only as 
a delegate of that power.”64  Further, “It is plain beyond dispute that 
proper provision for adequate housing for all categories of people is 
certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare 
required in all local land use regulation.”65  The SCNJ reasoned that “the 
general welfare which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must 
consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be parochially 
 
 59  N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 2. 
 60  Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 723. The Court explained, “New Jersey’s tax structure . . . 
has imposed on local real estate most of the cost of municipal and county government and of 
the primary and secondary education of the municipality’s children.  The latter expense is 
much the largest, so, basically, the fewer the school children, the lower the tax rate.”  Id.  The 
predictable result was that local planners “eagerly sought” industrial and commercial ratables 
while “homes and the lots on which they are situate[d] are required to be large enough . . . to 
have substantial value in order to produce greater tax revenues to meet school costs.”  Id.  
“Large families who cannot afford to buy large houses and must live in cheaper rental 
accommodations are definitely not wanted, so we find drastic bedroom restrictions for, or 
complete prohibition of, multi-family or other feasible housing for those of lesser income.”  
Id. 
 61  Mount Laurel I, at 723.  The Court carefully pointed out that Mount Laurel’s zoning 
policies were not rooted in animus against any race or class but were a pragmatic response to 
the state’s tax structure.  Certain types of municipal development were important “in order to 
produce greater tax revenues to meet school costs.”  Id. 
 62  See Mount Laurel I, at 726–27 (citing Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of 
Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347, 350 (N.J. 1949)). 
 63  Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 726. 
 64  Id. (emphasis added). 
 65  Id. at 727 (emphasis added). 
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confined to the claimed good of the particular municipality.”66 
It has to follow that . . . each such municipality must plan and 
provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable 
opportunity for . . . low and moderate cost housing, to meet 
the needs, desires and resources of all categories of 
people. . . . [I]t may not adopt regulations or policies which 
thwart or preclude that opportunity.67 
The SCNJ pronounced that “[i]t is required, affirmatively, [that] a 
zoning regulation . . . must promote public health, safety, morals or the 
general welfare. . . . Conversely, a zoning enactment which is contrary to 
the general welfare is invalid.”68 
The SCNJ’s decision to ground its holding in constitutional law is 
critical to the Mount Laurel doctrine’s significance and longevity.  An 
affordable-housing mandate embedded within the state constitution is not 
easily swept away by political caprice.69  More relevant to the substance 
of this note, a constitutional doctrine binds all government actors alike—
including all three branches of the state government.70 
B. Implementing the Mount Laurel Doctrine 
i. Mount Laurel II 
Despite the SCNJ’s intrepid holding in Mount Laurel I, the decision 
was essentially toothless.  Many towns openly refused to enforce it, and 
even Mount Laurel itself refused to implement the doctrine bearing its 
name.71  The SCNJ observed: 
After all this time, ten years after the trial court’s initial order 
invalidating its zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains 
afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary ordinance.  Papered 
over with studies, rationalized by hired experts, the ordinance 
at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel’s determination 
to exclude the poor.  Mount Laurel is not alone; we believe 
that there is widespread non-compliance with the 
constitutional mandate of our original opinion in this case.72 
With Mount Laurel II, the SCNJ resolved that “[t]o the best of our 
 
 66  Id. at 727–28. 
 67  Id. at 728. 
 68  Id. at 725 (emphasis added). 
 69  See N.J. CONST. art. IX (specifying the procedures to amend the state constitution). 
 70  STEVEN H. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 102–03 (6th ed. 2010) (“A constitution represents 
a mandate to the various branches of government directly from the people acting in their 
sovereign capacity.  It is distinguished from a law which is a rule of conduct prescribed by 
legislative agents of the people and subject to the limitations of the constitution. . . . The 
Constitution . . . is not designed to protect majorities, who can protect themselves, but to 
preserve and protect the rights of minorities against the arbitrary actions of those in power.”  
(citations omitted)). 
 71  Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 410. 
 72  Id. 
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ability, we shall not allow [this delay] to continue.”73  The SCNJ was 
“more firmly committed to the original Mount Laurel I doctrine than ever, 
and [it was] determined, within appropriate judicial bounds, to make it 
work.”74  Not only did Mount Laurel II reaffirm the constitutional 
obligation to provide affordable housing, but it provided a suite of tools 
to realize that obligation.75  After Mount Laurel I, constitutional 
compliance was at the discretion of each town; but after Mount Laurel II, 
the courts themselves could be an effective enforcement instrument, 
supplying a “special litigation track for exclusionary zoning cases and . . . 
a ‘builder’s remedy’ by which builders could file suit for the opportunity 
to construct housing at higher densities than a municipality otherwise 
would allow.”76  The SCNJ had “learned from experience . . . that unless 
a strong judicial hand is used, Mount Laurel will not result in housing, 
but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.”77 
ii. Fair Housing Act and the Council on Affordable Housing 
The New Jersey Legislature’s first move to respond to the Mount 
Laurel doctrine was its 1985 Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).78  The 
legislative findings in the FHA expressly incorporated the SCNJ’s 
reasoning: 
The [SCNJ], through its rulings in [Mount Laurel I] and 
[Mount Laurel II], has determined that every municipality in 
a growth area has a constitutional obligation to provide 
through its land use regulations a realistic opportunity for a 
fair share of its region’s present and prospective needs for 
housing for low and moderate income families. . . . The 
interest of all citizens . . . would be best served by a 
comprehensive planning and implementation in response to 
this constitutional obligation.79 
To promote this interest, the FHA created the Council on Affordable 
Housing (“COAH”), an administrative agency within the executive 
branch.80  Among the COAH’s duties, both upon its founding “and from 
time to time thereafter,” are to estimate the need for low and moderate-
income housing in the state and to adopt guidelines for municipalities to 
determine and satisfy their share of the burden.81 
The FHA also includes a process to allow a municipality to certify 
 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. at 390. 
 76  Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 36. 
 77  Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 410. 
 78  Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2015). 
 79  Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-302(a), (c). 
 80  Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-305. 
 81  Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-307. 
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its housing ordinances, rendering them presumptively valid against a 
Mount Laurel challenge for a limited time.82  To assure that future 
exclusionary zoning grievances would be managed by the COAH rather 
than by the courts, the FHA transferred all pending and future Mount 
Laurel litigation to the COAH except where a transfer might result in 
“manifest injustice.”83 
iii. First and Second-Round Rules 
Under the terms of the FHA, the COAH was to update its assessment 
of each town’s affordable-housing responsibility every six years.84  For 
the third round, this period would increase to ten years.85  In 1986 and 
1994, the COAH released its first and second-round rules, respectively, 
and both sets generally withstood legal challenge.86 
iv. Third-Round Rules 
The COAH was due to issue third-round rules in 1999, but political 
pressures caused a delay.87  It adopted interim rules at the end of the year 
to operate until it could draft an adequate final version.88  But the gap was 
longer than expected: permanent rules failed to issue for several more 
years, a delay that was “dramatic and inexplicable.”89  Once the COAH 
finally did propose permanent rules, the period they were supposed to 
have covered had nearly ended.90 
For nearly the equivalent of one full round of Mount Laurel 
administration, no municipality [was] held to updated 
standards reflecting its present and prospective fair share of 
the housing needs of its region.  The public policies 
underlying the FHA and the Mount Laurel cases have, quite 
obviously, been frustrated by inaction.91 
And even then, the proposed final rules were unsatisfactory.92  The 
Appellate Division granted the COAH yet another extension but warned 
 
 82  Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-313, 317. 
 83  Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-316.  The Court heard a constitutional challenge to the 
FHA but upheld it and “order[ed] that all of the cases pending before [it] be transferred to the 
Council.”  Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards (“Mount Laurel III”), 510 A.2d 621, 634 (N.J. 1986). 
 84  Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-307(c). 
 85  Fair Housing Act § 52:27D-307(c) (amended 2002). 
 86  FAIR SHARE HOUS. CTR., What is the Mount Laurel Doctrine? http://fairshare 
housing.org/mount-laurel-doctrine/ (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016). 
 87  Id. 
 88  In re Six Month Extension of N.J.A.C. 5:91-1 et seq., 855 A.2d 582, 586 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
 89  Id. at 602. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. at 602–03. 
 92  Id. at 608. 
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that “[t]he continued absence, for an unreasonable time, of a timely, valid 
and sufficiently comprehensive interim extension procedure . . . will, of 
course, free interested parties from” the COAH’s administrative 
restrictions and permit them to again petition the courts for Mount Laurel 
redress.93 
The COAH again attempted third-round rules in December 2004.94  
Two years later, the Appellate Division invalidated parts, but, in a display 
of superlative patience yet again, remanded the matter to the COAH to 
propose further revisions.95  The Appellate Division imposed a six-month 
time limit, placing the deadline in July 2007.96  It granted two further 
extensions, and the COAH finally offered its newest draft in January 
2008.97 
The January 2008 rules were beset immediately by legal challenges 
and, perhaps predictably, were rendered invalid in October 2010.98  The 
Appellate Division again demonstrated its apparently boundless patience 
and remanded the matter to the COAH, directing the agency “to 
redetermine prospective need based on a methodology similar to the ones 
used in the first and second round rules,” both of which had been held 
valid.99  The deadline was five months.100  This time, the SCNJ granted 
certification, affirmed the Appellate Division, and emphasized the 
gravity of the matter: 
Rules to govern the third round cannot wait further while time 
is lost during legislative deliberations on a new affordable 
housing approach.  A remedy must be put in place to 
eliminate the limbo in which municipalities, New Jersey 
citizens, developers, and affordable housing interest groups 
have lived for too long.101 
Nonetheless, the SCNJ granted another five-month compliance 
period, setting the deadline at February 26, 2014.102 
Naturally, on that date, the COAH filed for another extension.103  
Requesting a new deadline of May 1, 2014, its chairperson certified that 
the agency was diligently laboring on the third-round methodology; it had 
 
 93  Id. 
 94  36 N.J. Reg. 5895(a) (Dec. 20, 2004). 
 95  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95 by N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 914 
A.2d 348, 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). 
 96  Id. 
 97  Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 36. 
 98  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 6 A.3d 445, 450 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010). 
 99  Id. at 460. 
 100  Id. at 476. 
 101  In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96, 74 A.3d 893, 917 (N.J. 2013). 
 102  Id.; Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 36. 
 103  Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 36. 
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reviewed the relevant data but was continuing to evaluate it.104  The SCNJ 
later learned that the COAH had hired a consultant to draft the rules just 
three weeks before it requested the extension.105  On March 14, 2014, the 
SCNJ granted the motion but attached a warning, “[I]f COAH did not 
adopt Third Round Rules by November 17, 2014, the Court would 
entertain applications for relief,” including requests to suspend the FHA’s 
provision protecting municipalities against litigation.106  Suspending the 
provision would permit “actions [to] be commenced on a case-by-case 
basis before the Law Division or in the form of ‘builder’s remedy’ 
challenges.”107 
C. Latest Developments 
i. COAH’s Failure 
Though the COAH was supposed to have issued the third-round 
rules in 1999, the COAH’s board found itself convened in April 2014—
fifteen years later—to discuss the latest attempt and to vote on whether 
to propose the draft that the board had received just twenty-four hours 
earlier.108  The draft passed and was published in the New Jersey Register 
on June 2, 2014.109  A public comment period lasted until August 1, 2014, 
provoking approximately 3,000 comments.110  The SCNJ’s March 14, 
2014 order required the COAH to finally adopt third-round rules by 
October 22, 2014 and the board met two days prior to vote on adoption.111  
However, the vote split 3-3 and the rules were not adopted.112 
The Fair Share Housing Center quickly filed a motion seeking a 
return to judicial enforcement of the Mount Laurel doctrine.113  At oral 
argument in January 2015, before the parties spoke on the merits, the 
SCNJ requested an update on the COAH’s progress toward drafting and 
adopting acceptable third-round rules, reminding the COAH 
representative that “nothing limited [the COAH’s] continuing ability to 
 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id.  Writing retrospectively in 2015, the Court stated, “It has since come to light that 
COAH retained its primary consultant for the development of new regulations on February 6, 
2014.”  Id. 
 106  Id. at 36–37. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 35, 37. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. 
JOSEPH MARSICO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/30/2017  12:17 PM 
2017] A FORTY-YEAR FAILURE 163 
adopt the required regulations” even as motion practice was ongoing.114  
The representative admitted that 
COAH has not conducted or scheduled any further meetings 
since its October 2014 meeting, that it does not have any 
plans to meet further in an effort to adopt Third Round Rules, 
and that staff have not been directed to perform any work in 
furtherance of adoption of Third Round Rules.115 
Nonetheless, the COAH asserted that it “had not been willfully 
contumacious,” had “made all possible efforts to comply with the SCNJ’s 
order,” and had “neither ignored nor willfully violated” the order.116 
ii. SCNJ’s Granted Relief 
Though the COAH pleaded for yet another extension, the SCNJ 
“reject[ed] the argument that relief should be withheld in order to allow 
COAH even ‘more time’ than it has already been given.”117  In a moment 
ripe for a ruthless judicial reprimand—the COAH had dallied for a 
decade and a half, had repeatedly submitted inadequate rules, and had 
flouted numerous court-ordered deadlines—the SCNJ’s tone was 
relatively delicate, 
[T]he clarity of COAH’s inaction is apparent. . . . COAH has 
had fifteen years to adopt Third Round Rules as it is required 
to do in accordance with its statutory mission.  It has been 
under several orders of the Appellate Division and this Court 
directing it to adopt Third Round Rules using a known 
methodology by specific deadlines. It has not done so.  More 
time is not a viable response.118 
It was evident that “the administrative forum is not capable of 
functioning as intended by the FHA.”119  The SCNJ could conclude only 
that “towns must subject themselves to judicial review for constitutional 
compliance, as was the case before the FHA was enacted.”120  After all, 
the Mount Laurel doctrine is a constitutional doctrine, and “the courts 
always present an available forum for redress of alleged constitutional 
violations.”121  “The relief authorized is remedial of constitutional 
rights.”122 
The SCNJ decided that “the courts may resume their role as the 
forum of first instance for evaluating municipal compliance with Mount 
 
 114  Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 37. 
 115  Id. at 37–38. 
 116  Id. at 38. 
 117  Id. at 40. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. at 42. 
 120  Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 42. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. at 43. 
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Laurel obligations.”123  It described comprehensive procedures for lower 
courts to observe when hearing Mount Laurel challenges, and it delayed 
the order for ninety days “as a matter of basic fairness” to towns that had 
made good-faith efforts to comply with Mount Laurel despite the 
COAH’s neglect.124  This judicial process was designed “to track the 
[administrative] processes provided for in the FHA” so as to “facilitate a 
return to a system of coordinated administrative and court actions in the 
event that COAH eventually promulgates constitutional Third Round 
Rules that will allow for the reinstitution of agency proceedings.”125  The 
courts were not to become a “replacement agency” and, the SCNJ 
repeated several times, “[T]he action taken herein does not prevent either 
COAH or the Legislature from taking steps to restore a viable 
administrative remedy that towns can use in satisfaction of their 
constitutional obligation.”126  But finally, it was time for the SCNJ to act 
where the legislature and executive had not; the Mount Laurel doctrine 
and its constitutional mandate were “premised on the existence of a 
functioning agency, not a moribund one.”127 
III. ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT 
The SCNJ should take firm control of Mount Laurel enforcement 
and relieve the legislature and executive of their power to further stall, 
obstruct, or dilute the doctrine.  This proposed solution is drastic but 
necessary to preserve the legitimacy of the constitutional mandate 
articulated in Mount Laurel I and affirmed by its progeny cases. 
Regardless, “drastic” should not be read as synonymous with 
“excessive” or “imprudent.”  The SCNJ is justified in taking drastic 
action because the other branches—which the judicial branch must check 
and balance—have abandoned their duties.  As it pertains to Mount 
Laurel, the administrative process is “nonfunctioning” and COAH is 
“moribund.”128  Simply, it has failed. 
There are three chief reasons that the SCNJ may and must become 
the unilateral instrument of Mount Laurel enforcement.  First, Mount 
Laurel compliance is not just an optimistic public-policy goal but a strict 
constitutional requirement.129  “[T]he courts always present an available 
 
 123  Id. at 42–43. 
 124  Id. at 44–48, 43. 
 125  Id. at 48. 
 126  Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 48, 50–51. 
 127  Id. at 34. 
 128  Id. 
 129  See infra Part III.A. 
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forum for redress of alleged constitutional violations.”130  Second, seizing 
control would not be an unprecedented coup, but rather would resemble 
past judicial interventions that produced favorable outcomes.131  Third, 
the SCNJ has proven itself to be a trustworthy steward of the critical 
Mount Laurel mission where the other branches have failed.132 
A. Mount Laurel as a Constitutional Doctrine 
It is relatively easy to forgive the legislature for overrunning its 
budget or the governor for publicly bickering with political opponents, 
not because these blunders are necessarily trivial but because they do not 
carry constitutional implications.  But Mount Laurel is a constitutional 
doctrine.133  It binds government actors and compels their action because 
it is backed by the weight of the state constitution, which is itself “a 
mandate to the . . . government directly from the people.”134  By 
articulating the Mount Laurel doctrine to be contained within and 
mandated by the state constitution, the SCNJ imbued the doctrine with 
full constitutional authority.135 
The nature of the American constitutional system “is that individuals 
need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right.  
The Nation’s courts are open to injured individuals who come to them to 
vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic charter.”136  A 
person injured by a violation of some constitutional right can petition the 
courts for a remedy “even if the broader public disagrees and even if the 
legislature refuses to act.”137  Indeed, the very “idea of the Constitution 
‘was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials 
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.’”138 
B. Mount Laurel and Brown 
The Mount Laurel saga resembles, at least in form, a more 
prominent line of constitutional decisions.  In Brown v. Board of 
 
 130  Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d at 42. 
 131  See infra Part III.B. 
 132  See infra Part III.C. 
 133  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 134  STEVEN H. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 102 (5th ed. 2003). 
 135  Id. at 278 (defining “judicial review” as “the review by a court of law of some act, or 
failure to act, by a government official or entity. . . . Under this doctrine . . . the highest courts 
of every state have assumed the power and responsibility to decide the constitutionality of 
acts of the legislative and executive branches of their respective jurisdictions.”). 
 136  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015). 
 137  Id. 
 138  Id. at 2605–06 (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
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Education (“Brown I”), the United States Supreme Court held that racial 
segregation deprived schoolchildren of their constitutional equal-
protection rights.139  After declaring this principle, the Court ordered 
further fact-finding and argument so that it could formulate a specific 
remedy.140  Within a year, a second Brown v. Board of Education case 
(“Brown II”) remanded each of the consolidated Brown I cases to their 
respective District Courts and directed the courts “to take such [action] 
as [is] necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these 
cases.”141 
Even then, certain high-profile politicians opposed integration.142  
United States Senator Harry Byrd promoted a “Southern Manifesto” 
signed by more than one hundred Congressmen.143  Virginia was among 
several states to defy the Supreme Court.144  Its “Massive Resistance” 
strategy included a variety of anti-integration laws that were facially and 
deliberately unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s plain 
conclusion that segregation violated equal protection and its plain 
instruction that the states must integrate their schools.145  By 1964, ten 
years after Brown I, “only [five] percent of black students in Virginia 
were attending integrated schools.”146 
Congress eventually cooperated in the Brown mission by enacting 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.147  Title VI of the Act prompted compliance 
in a way the Supreme Court’s order alone could not: it threatened to 
withdraw federal funding from any program that discriminated on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin.148 
 
 139  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (“Brown I”), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 140  Id. at 496. 
 141  Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (“Brown II”), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
 142  See Massive Resistance, VA. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www. 
vahistorical.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history-explorer/civil-rights-movement-
virginia/massive. 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. 
 146  Passive Resistance, VA. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www. 
vahistorical.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history-explorer/civil-rights-movement-
virginia/passive. 
 147  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-02, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d). 
 148  Id. §§ 601–02 (“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . . 
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the 
termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to 
any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity 
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For the experienced jurists sitting on the SCNJ to decide Mount 
Laurel I, Brown could not have been far from mind.149  The Brown 
decisions were just two decades old and remained a sterling example of 
the judiciary recognizing an acute injustice and crafting a remedy where 
the political branches had failed.  While a comparison to the revered 
Brown decisions always risks stumbling into hyperbole, it is not 
unreasonable to note their basic resemblance to the Mount Laurel cases.  
In both Brown and Mount Laurel, the courts heard complaints by minority 
groups alleging that government actors had violated their rights.  The 
courts broke ground by recognizing “fundamental rights” that had not 
been previously observed.  Yet both decisions were politically unpopular 
in some sectors, and enforcement was neither easy nor immediate.  
Finally, in both cases, the respective legislatures eventually lent their 
support by passing statutes to promote compliance with the constitutional 
mandate: Congress with its Civil Rights Act to, inter alia, promote 
integration, and the New Jersey Legislature with its Fair Housing Act to 
streamline and formalize the affordable housing mission. 
At this point, the two stories diverge.  Racial integration is today an 
uncontroversial principle: a Gallup poll in 1994 found that eighty-seven 
percent of Americans approved of Brown, a figure that consistently 
increased in the decades following the case and is likely higher today.150  
But affordable housing, particularly as formulated in Mount Laurel, 
remains fiercely contested.  New Jersey Governor Chris Christie pushed 
in 2010 to end the “COAH nightmare” and to “[place housing 
development] back into the hands of local municipalities.”151  He took 
 
for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement . . . .”). 
 149  See Robert C. Holmes, The Clash of Home Rule and Affordable Housing: The Mount 
Laurel Story Continues, 12 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 325, 347 n.161 (2013) (“A case likely in the 
minds of the Mount Laurel court is Brown v. Bd. of Education.  The court also likely 
considered familiar adages associated with social change: that rules are not self-executing and 
that a rule change is no good without a political base to support it.”  (citations omitted)). 
 150  Joseph Carroll, Race and Education 50 Years After Brown v. Board of Education, 
GALLUP NEWS SERV. (May 14, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/11686/race-education-
years-after-brown-board-education.aspx.  Even though the American public overwhelmingly 
endorses integration, it remains an incomplete mission and, in fact, may be regressing from 
the victories achieved immediately post-Brown.  This note poses the Brown comparison as an 
example of aggressive judicial action to recognize and enforce a constitutional right; however, 
it should not be read to imply that Brown has been an unmitigated success or that such judicial 
action guarantees favorable outcomes in the long term.  See generally Gary Orfield et al., 
Brown at 60: Great Progress, a Long Retreat and an Uncertain Future, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT (May 2014), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-
education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-
uncertain-future/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf (examining the state of race- and wealth-based 
segregation in schools six decades after Brown). 
 151  Lisa Fleisher, N.J. Gov. Chris Christie Creates Task Force to Review Affordable 
Housing, NJ.COM (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/02/ 
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steps to dismantle the agency altogether.152  The legislature expressed its 
own animus toward Mount Laurel when it passed a bill to abolish the 
COAH and devolve affordable-housing authority back to local 
governments.153 
While the COAH survived the assault by the political branches, the 
move against it was not the work of a renegade governor and 
legislature.154  For decades, critics have condemned the Mount Laurel 
doctrine, both on separation of powers grounds and for the perceived 
damage it has done to New Jersey taxpayers.155  In a 1985 New York 
Times editorial, New Jersey Assemblyman William Flynn pointed out 
that the judiciary “consists of no elected officials” and argued that “the 
recent Mount Laurel housing decisions” had “usurp[ed] the law-making 
power of the Legislature.”156  A 2012 article cast the SCNJ as “the most 
activist state appellate court in America” and accused it of “hijacking 
zoning powers from towns and cities.”157  The SCNJ’s “builder’s 
remedy” mechanism was “a nightmarish burden on communities” and the 
Mount Laurel doctrine overall had “transformed many towns” for the 
worse.158  A 2014 editorial lamented the “sorry tradition” of Republican 
governors “endors[ing] a liberal activist chief justice,” exemplified by 
Chief Justice Richard Hughes, who headed the SCNJ when Mount Laurel 
I “imposed Soviet-style housing plans on every municipality in the 
state.”159  “By the time Hughes was done, the state was being run by its 
 
nj_gov_chris_christie_creates_1.html. 
 152  STATE OF N.J. EXEC. DEP’T., Reorganization Plan No. 001-2011, A Plan for the 
Abolition of the Council on Affordable Housing and Providing for the Transfer of the 
Functions, Powers, and Duties of the Council on Affordable Housing to the Department of 
Community Affairs (June 29, 2011), http://www.nj.gov/dca/services/lps/hss/transinfo/001-
2011.pdf. 
 153  S. 1, 214th Leg., 2010–11 Sess. (N.J. 2010) (conditionally vetoed Jan. 2011).  See also 
News Release, Giordano Halleran & Ciesla, New Jersey State Senate Passes Bill S-1, 
GIORDANO HALLERAN & CIESLA ATTORNEYS AT LAW, http://www.ghclaw.com/65C0C8 
/Articles/2010/GianettiNewsRelease2010.pdf (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016). 
 154  In re Plan for the Abolition of the Council on Affordable Hous., 70 A.3d 559 (N.J. 
2013). 
 155  Taxation in New Jersey is a frequently contentious political issue, considering the 
state’s already-high rates.  See Jared Walczak, How High Are Property Taxes in Your State?, 
TAX FOUND. BLOG (Aug. 13, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/how-high-are-property-
taxes-your-state. 
 156  William E. Flynn, New Jersey Opinion; On the Checks and Balances Within the State 
Government, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/03/ 
opinion/new-jersey-opinion-on-the-checks-and-balances-within-the-state-government.html. 
 157  Steven Malanga, The Court That Broke Jersey, CITY J. (Winter 2012), 
http://www.city-journal.org/2012/22_1_nj-supreme-court.html. 
 158  Id. 
 159  Paul Mulshine, Editorial, Chris Christie Dooms NJ to Judicial Activism and Himself 
to Obscurity, NJ.COM (May 27, 2014), http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/ 
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Supreme Court rather than its legislature and governor.”160 
New Jerseyans in general are more divided on the issue, but there is 
hardly a zealous public movement to support the SCNJ’s action.  In a 
2009 poll, only just more than half of the respondents approved of the 
basic Mount Laurel affordable-housing principle.161  Three quarters of 
respondents knew little or nothing at all about the cases themselves or 
about the COAH.162 
To be fair, the Mount Laurel doctrine is not some divine instruction; 
it, like all products of government, is necessarily imperfect, if only 
because the interests of the myriad New Jersey municipalities are 
complex and diverse.  But the doctrine remains an interpretation of the 
state constitution, and its requirements are not easily dismissed simply 
because they prove difficult to implement, politically unpopular, or 
burdensome on the tax base.163  While Mount Laurel bears certain 
resemblances to Brown, the latter today represents an uncontroversial 
public value—that racial integration is beneficial and desirable—while 
the values underlying the former do not enjoy similar support.  Faithfully 
vindicating Mount Laurel will require the active leadership of a body that 
can observe its constitutional duty without bending to political or popular 
criticism. 
C. SCNJ’s Stewardship of the Mount Laurel Mission 
Many of the Mount Laurel criticisms are grounded in the notion that 
both the original doctrine and its subsequent enforcement were mere bald 
gambits by the SCNJ to seize political power.  Mount Laurel was 
lawmaking from the bench, a clear encroachment of the judiciary into a 
space reserved for the legislature.  However, the SCNJ’s words and 
actions more fairly characterize the court as only a reluctant executor of 
the doctrine. 
i. Mount Laurel I 
In the very first Mount Laurel trial court case, the Law Division 
ordered the defendant towns to draft an affordable-housing plan, but it 
intended to retain jurisdiction of the matter only “until a final order 
 
2014/05/chris_christies_judicial_picks_put_activists_in_control_mulshine.html. 
 160  Id. 
 161  FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIV., Opinion Poll, Mt. Laurel, COAH, and the Race for 
Governor (Feb. 25–Mar. 2, 2009), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/coah/. 
 162  Id. 
 163  Cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  While discussing affirmative action in 
higher education, the Supreme Court stated, “The fact that the implementation of a program 
[that satisfies constitutional requirements] might present administrative challenges does not 
render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.”  Id. at 275. 
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issue[d] requiring implementation of the plan as agreed upon.”164  From 
the very start, there was no design for the courts to become a permanent 
enforcer; they would merely inspect a town’s proposal, approve its terms, 
and then withdraw from the matter.  The SCNJ, affirming the Law 
Division by deciding Mount Laurel I, settled on much the same 
conclusion, and it explicitly recognized that local governments were to 
retain autonomy: “It is the local function and responsibility, in the first 
instance at least, rather than the court’s, to decide on the details of the 
same within the guidelines we have laid down.”165  “It is not appropriate 
at this time . . . to deal with the matter of the further extent of judicial 
power in the field or to exercise any such power.”166 
ii. Mount Laurel II 
In Mount Laurel II, the SCNJ again was alert to how critics might 
perceive its action. Its strategy was to acknowledge the controversy: 
[A] brief reminder of the judicial role in this sensitive area is 
appropriate, since powerful reasons suggest, and we agree, 
that the matter is better left to the Legislature.  We act first 
and foremost because the Constitution of our State requires 
protection of the interests involved and because the 
Legislature has not protected them.  We recognize the social 
and economic controversy (and its political consequences) 
that has resulted in relatively little legislative action in this 
field.  We understand the enormous difficulty of achieving a 
political consensus that might lead to significant legislation 
enforcing the constitutional mandate better than we can, 
legislation that might completely remove this Court from 
those controversies.  But enforcement of constitutional rights 
cannot await a supporting political consensus.  So while we 
have always preferred legislative to judicial action in this 
field, we shall continue—until the Legislature acts—to do 
our best to uphold the constitutional obligation that underlies 
the Mount Laurel doctrine.  That is our duty.  We may not 
build houses, but we do enforce the Constitution.167 
The SCNJ viewed itself as the reluctant but duty-bound torchbearer 
of the state constitution. 
The provision of decent housing for the poor is not a function 
of this Court.  Our only role is to see to it that zoning does not 
prevent it, but rather provides a realistic opportunity for its 
construction as required by New Jersey’s Constitution.  The 
actual construction of that housing will continue to depend, 
in a much larger degree, on the economy, on private 
enterprise, and on the actions of the other branches of 
government at the national, state and local level.  We intend 
 
 164  S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d at 474. 
 165  Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 734. 
 166  Id. 
 167  Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 417 (emphasis added). 
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here only to make sure that if the poor remain locked into 
urban slums, it will not be because we failed to enforce the 
Constitution.168 
iii. Fair Housing Act, Council on Affordable Housing, and 
Beyond 
In Hills Development Company v. Bernards (“Mount Laurel III”), 
the SCNJ heard and rejected a challenge to the FHA, effectively ratifying 
the legislature’s response to Mount Laurel.169  The SCNJ did caution that 
“[i]f . . . the [FHA], despite the intention behind it, achieves nothing but 
delay, the judiciary will be forced to resume its appropriate role”; 
however, presumably, Mount Laurel III should have signaled the end of 
the SCNJ’s role in the affordable-housing controversy.170  The COAH, a 
legislatively created executive agency, now had the reins.  While “the 
[COAH’s] decisions can still be challenged in court,” the courts “will [for 
the most part] be out of the zoning business.”171  Chief Justice Robert 
Wilentz wrote, “This kind of response, one that would permit us to 
withdraw from this field, is what this court has always wanted and 
sought.  It is potentially far better for the state and its lower-income 
citizens.”172 
The birth of the COAH quieted the controversy momentarily, until 
it was time for the agency to compose and adopt third-round rules.173  
Considering the importance of the COAH’s work, the SCNJ arguably 
could have been justified in taking a firmer hand at the first sign of delay.  
Instead, it repeatedly granted extensions for the COAH to draft and re-
draft the rules.174  It took fifteen years for the SCNJ’s patience to 
expire.175  Even then, as the SCNJ ordered a return to the judicial 
remedies it had practiced before Mount Laurel II, it was circumspect: its 
aim was not to usurp the COAH and modify its procedures to suit judicial 
preference, but rather to act as a surrogate until the COAH had put its 
own house into order, so to speak. 
The process developed herein is one that seeks to track the 
processes provided for in the FHA.  Doing so will facilitate a 
return to a system of coordinated administrative and court 
actions in the event that COAH eventually promulgates 
 
 168  Id. at 490 (emphasis added). 
 169  Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d 621. 
 170  Id. at 633 (emphasis added). 
 171  Op-Ed, Judicial Duty in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 1986), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/24/opinion/judicial-duty-in-new-jersey.html. 
 172  Id. (emphasis added). 
 173  See supra Part II.B.3–4. 
 174  See supra Part II.B.4. 
 175  See Mount Laurel IV, 110 A.3d 31. 
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constitutional Third Round Rules that will allow for the 
reinstitution of agency proceedings.  The judicial role here is 
not to become a replacement agency for COAH.  The agency 
is sui generis—a legislatively created, unique device for 
securing satisfaction of Mount Laurel obligations.  In opening 
the courts for hearing challenges to, or applications seeking 
declarations of, municipal compliance with specific 
obligations, it is not this Court’s province to create an 
alternate form of statewide administrative decision maker for 
unresolved policy details of replacement Third Round 
Rules.176 
The SCNJ further emphasized that it would not resist if the COAH 
or the legislature moved to overrule its decision. 
[N]othing herein should be understood to prevent COAH 
from fulfilling its statutory mission to adopt constitutional 
rules to govern municipalities’ Third Round obligations in 
compliance with the FHA.  Nor should the action taken by 
this Court, in the face of COAH’s failure to fulfill its statutory 
mission, be regarded as impeding the Legislature from 
considering alternative statutory remedies to the present 
FHA.177 
Even the doctrine’s most cynical critic must concede that the SCNJ 
has been eager to yield to its collateral branches.  But the SCNJ has also 
demonstrated that it will not compromise the principles expressed in 
Mount Laurel. 
D. Proposed Solution 
The SCNJ’s reluctance to take control is precisely why it should be 
trusted with control.  The court is mindful of its role in the machinery of 
government, and its words and actions over the last forty years indicate 
that its motive in regard to Mount Laurel is merely to enforce the 
Constitution.178  In contrast, the other branches’ motives are colored by 
political and partisan factors.  Each time the SCNJ has acted, it has been 
only to mend an injury that the other branches caused, whether by total 
neglect or by ineffective half-measures.  The political branches have not 
only shirked their constitutional duty but have actively thwarted it.  As 
long as Mount Laurel is enforced—or not—at the pleasure of the 
legislature or an executive agency, the affordable-housing mission first 
charged in Mount Laurel I will not be achieved. 
 
 176  Id. at 48 (emphasis added). 
 177  Id. at 34–35. 
 178  Even beyond the Mount Laurel context, consider the Court’s record of ruling against 
its own self-interest when the Constitution demands it.  “Judges, to the extent humanly 
possible, interpret the Constitution fairly, fearlessly, and independently, even when the issue 
touches on the judiciary’s institutional concerns.”  In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 895 A.2d 
1128, 1143 (N.J. 2006) (citing cases where the Court’s decision had the effect of reducing 
judicial power in a particular area). 
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There must be a judicial solution.  Before the legislature passed the 
FHA, municipalities were subject to the procedures authorized in Mount 
Laurel II—particularly, builder’s remedy courts and a special litigation 
track dedicated to exclusionary housing claims.  This note proposes a 
permanent return to the Mount Laurel II scheme or one substantially 
similar to it.  The courts originally withdrew from the affordable-housing 
issue when the legislature stepped in, believing judicial leadership was 
no longer necessary, but the record is clear that a task as controversial as 
affordable housing in New Jersey cannot be handled effectively by a body 
subject to political pressures. 
Because the Mount Laurel II scheme proved unpopular among 
certain factions, the legislature might move to again craft a statutory 
response as it did with the FHA in 1985.  But the SCNJ must remain 
skeptical and permit alternative remedies only when it can be confident 
that such remedies would effectively fulfill the constitutional mandate.  
The SCNJ might even permit a legislative option to coexist with its own 
judicial enforcement scheme.  However, at all times, the judicial scheme 
should remain available to resolve an exclusionary zoning complaint in 
the first instance.  The SCNJ was fooled when it trusted the political 
branches to faithfully assume the burden and it should not be fooled 
again. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mount Laurel I made clear that the New Jersey Constitution requires 
each municipality to bear a reasonable portion of the state’s collective 
affordable housing burden.  While the decision remains controversial 
today, its constitutional authority remains, and there can be no question 
that it continues to bind both the state government and each local 
government exercising the police power.  However, the legislative and 
executive branches have proven repeatedly that they are obstacles to 
properly realizing Mount Laurel.  Where there are constitutional rights at 
stake, it is both the SCNJ’s power and duty to supply relief.  The SCNJ 
should take charge of Mount Laurel enforcement to assure the state’s 
citizens the housing rights guaranteed by their constitution. 
In the interest of completeness, it should be acknowledged that this 
note presumes that Mount Laurel is both constitutionally sound and, 
ultimately, a good policy choice for New Jersey.  Arguments that the 
doctrine is unconstitutional (or, at least, is not constitutionally required) 
or that it is bad public policy have been thoroughly addressed elsewhere 
and are outside the scope of this note.  Further, the entire issue of judicial 
involvement in Mount Laurel would be obviated if the people of New 
Jersey were to amend their constitution to foreclose the SCNJ from 
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participating in the affordable-housing issue or to exclude any 
interpretation that would grant a constitutional right to housing.  Finally, 
to what extent the earlier proposed solution is practicable is, again, 
outside the scope of this note.  To implement such an intricate solution to 
such a complicated problem would require much more fact-finding and 
analysis than this note is able to contain. 
 
